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INTRODUCTION

Unauthorized Practice of Law (UPL) rules, which prohibit
nonlawyers from providing legal services, date back to a royal
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ordinance that King Edward I of England enacted in 1292.1 In 1402, the
British Parliament established the foundation for modem UPL rules by
2
enacting 4 Henry IV, Chapter 18. Pursuant to that statute, the justices
authorized to practice law only those learned individuals who3
duties.
demonstrated virtuosity and who swore to their professional
The state bars that regulate the American legal profession have followed
suit by enacting and enforcing similar UPL rules.4 Though deeply
engrained in our legal system, these UPL rules undermine the U.S.
economy's fundamental free-market principles5 by reserving for
attorneys the exclusive right to provide services that other licensed
professionals may prove more qualified to render.6 Consequently,
American UPL rules have provoked intense debate 7-particularly with
to offer professional services that relate
respect to nonlawyers' ability
8
law.
to
only tangentially
1. Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Minn. 1951). The Gardner Court noted
that King Edward I, by royal ordinance, enacted what was probably the first statute regulating
the practice of law, the Statute of Westminster, the First. Id. This statute limited the practice of
law to those deemed "the most lawful and the most teachable" to ensure that "the king and
people . .. be well served." Id. (citations omitted).

2. R.I. Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Servs. Ass'n, 179 A. 139, 144 (R.I. 1935).
3. Id.
4. See Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutional and
EmpiricalAnalysis of Unauthorized PracticeProhibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1981) (citing
Christensen, The Unauthorized Practice of Law: Do Good Fences Really Make Good
Neighbors-orEven Good Sense?, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 159 (providing a comprehensive
historical account of UPL)).
5. The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission have recognized that
the ABA's overbroad UPL rules "could restrain competition between lawyers and nonlawyers to
provide similar services to American consumers," which would "likely raise costs for
consumers and limit their competitive choices." Letter from Department of Justice & Federal
Trade Commission, to the Task Force on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/12/lettertoaba.shtm [hereinafter DOJ/FTC
Joint Letter to ABA].
6. See Anthony J. Luppino, MultidisciplinaryBusiness PlanningFirms: Expanding the
Regulatory Tent Without Creating a Circus, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 109, 145 (2004); see also
Catherine D. Black & Stephen T. Black, A National Tax Bar: An End to the AttorneyAccountant Tax Turf War, 36 ST. MARY's L.J. 1, 92 (2004) (concluding, based on an extensive
analysis of the intricacies of tax law, that "[an attorney with nothing more than the ABA
required courses is not qualified to practice tax"); see also George C. Nnona, Situating
Multidisciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-Professional
Competition, 80 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 849, 898 (2006) (stating that "most CPAs know something
about the federal income tax; many if not most lawyers do not").
7. Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective: Alternative Approaches to
Nonlawyer Practice, 1 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETuIcs 197, 197 (1996); see Nnona, supra note 6,
at 853 (noting that UPL has become the subject of intense debate among legal scholars).
8. Rhode, supra note 7, at 197. See, e.g., In re N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, 78
N.Y.S.2d 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948), aff'd, In re Bercu, 299 N.Y. 728, 87 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y.
1949) (holding that advice as to the deduction related to the client's payment of backed N.Y.
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Proponents of strict UPL rules claim that the rules are necessary to
protect the public from individuals who lack the requisite technical and
ethical training to provide competent legal services. 9 Nevertheless, the
overbroad drafting and unpredictable application of these rules has led
many to challenge their propriety. 0 Opponents of strict UPL rules argue
that the rules secure for attorneys a monopoly over practically any
service that is even remotely legal in nature.' The enforcement of UPL
rules against professional service providers is a serious concern not only
because it carries harsh penalties, such as contempt, injunction, criminal
liability, and fines; 12 but also because clients can assert UPL to avoid

paying professional fees.' 3 Because accounting services are inextricably
intertwined with the law, 14 Certified Public Accountants 5 (CPAs) are
City excise taxes constituted UPL).
9. See Palmer v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 97747, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 109, at *9
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2007) (explaining that the justification for UPL is "not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised
and represented in legal matters by incompetent and unreliable persons, over whom the judicial
department could exercise little control") (quoting Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 52 N.E.2d 27, 31
(1943) (internal quotations omitted)).
10. See, e.g., Black & Black, supra note 6, at 97; see also Matthew A. Melone, Income
Tax Practice and Certified Public Accountants: The Casefor a Status Based Exemption from
State UnauthorizedPracticeof Law Rules, 11 AKRON TAX J. 47 (1995); Luppino, supra note 6,
at 133 (stating that the ABA's extremely broad definition of the "practice of law" has drawn
much criticism by government agencies and constituents who engage in law-related work).
11. See generally Ippolito v. Florida, 824 F. Supp. 1562 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (involving
allegations that the Florida Bar engaged in racketeering); see also John S. Dzienkowski &
Robert J. Peroni, Multidisciplinary Practice and The American Legal Profession: A Market
Approach to Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in The Twenty-First Century, 69
FORDHAM L. REv. 83, 92 (2000) (stating that "the unauthorized-practice-of-law rules give
lawyers a monopoly over the way in which the need for legal services is satisfied in this
country.").
12. Michael J. Herzog, Note and Comment, Tax Dispute Representation: The Time is
Ripe to Allow Certified Public Accountants Access to the Tribunal, 18 J.L. & COM. 355, 356
(1999); see generally Miami County Bar Ass'n v. Wyandt & Silvers, Inc., 838 N.E.2d 655
(Ohio 2005) (upholding a $20,000 civil penalty against an accountant for UPL because the
accountant advised clients on incorporation and assisted with the filing of corporate documents).
13. See, e.g., Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161, 166 (N.D. 1986) (allowing a client to
avoid paying his lawyer's fees because the lawyer was not licensed to practice in the state where
the lawyer performed the services); see also Agran v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 623 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1954) (denying a CPA recovery of his fees because the CPA provided services
that constituted UPL).
14. See Agran, 273 P.2d at 623 (stating that "in the field of taxation [] questions of law
and accounting are frequently inextricably intermingled as a result of which doubt arises as to
where the functions of one profession end and those of the other begin."); see also Lowell Bar
Ass 'n, 52 N.E.2d 27 at 32 (stating that "[t]he work of an accountant necessarily brings him into
touch with rules of law which he must understand if his computations and conclusions are to
stand the test of possible litigation."); see also Nnona, supra note 6, at 891 (explaining that
accounting's foundation draws on a wide array of disciplines, including law, bookkeeping,
economics, and statistics).
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16
among the professionals most profoundly affected by UPL rules.
Consequently, CPAs have fervently attacked these rules, urging the
American Bar Association (ABA) and state bars to exempt CPAs from
UPL rules based on their licensed status (status-based exemption) and
and business
approve the offering of integrated accounting, tax, legal,
7
(MDPs).1
practices
multidisciplinary
services through
Despite the oppressive constraints that UPL rules impose on CPAs,
several mechanisms have emerged through which CPAs have
successfully circumvented the rules. First, the federal government has
passed legislation and promulgated regulations that expressly authorize
CPAs to provide a wide array of tax services. 18 The federal preemption
doctrine operates to override the applicability to these services of state
UPL rules.' 9 In addition, the U.S. Tax Court permits nonlawyer CPAs
who pass an exam to litigate tax cases in the Tax Court. Finally,
Congress has granted CPAs substantially the same protections over
client communications that attorneys have traditionally enjoyed. 2 1
Ultimately, the federal government has recognized through its actions
that the stringent licensure requirements and regulatory oversight of
22
CPAs makes them uniquely qualified to perform certain legal services.
This Article's purpose is to analyze the effect of current UPL rules
on CPAs and assess whether the enforcement of UPL rules against
CPAs promotes the underlying policy of protecting the public. Part I
examines the source, policy, and operation of UPL rules. Using seminal
UPL cases, Part II illustrates how regulators and courts have failed to
develop a workable definition or test for determining which activities
constitute the practice of law. Part III discusses the legal mechanisms

15. "Certified Public Accountant" is the statutory title of qualified accountants in the
United States who have passed the Uniform CPA Exam and who have met other educational
and experience requirements imposed by state boards of accountancy. See infra Part VI
(discussing the requirements to become a CPA). In the late 1890's, accounting became the first
profession officially recognized in the United States. York County Bar Ass'n v. Kirk, No. 99SU-00772-07, 2002 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 111 (Pa. County Ct. Dec. 20, 2002).
16. See generally Elijah D. Farrell, Accounting Firms and the UnauthorizedPractice of
Law: Who Is the Bar Really Trying to Protect?,33 IND. L. REV. 599, 602-05 (2000) (discussing

the impact of UPL rules on the largest global accounting firms).
17. See DOJ/FTCJoint Letter to ABA, supra note 5; see also Kimberly E. Frank et al.,
CPAs' Perceptions of the Emerging Multidisciplinary Accounting/Legal Practice, J. ACCT.
HORIZONS, Mar. 2001; see also Marc N. Biamonte, Note, MultidisciplinaryPractices:Must a
Change to Model Rule 5.4 Apply to All Law Firms Uniformly?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1161, 1162

(2001) (noting that the major accounting firms are mobilizing a powerful lobby to change the
laws in the United States, enabling them to directly compete with law firms).
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.A
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra PartV.
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through which nonlawyer CPAs have overridden traditional UPL
restrictions and engaged in federally-authorized practice of law. Part IV
describes the ABA's unwillingness to fulfill an overwhelming demand
for MDP firms that provide integrated legal and non-legal services.
Finally, Part V demonstrates that CPAs, by virtue of their licensure,
possess more than adequate technical proficiency, competence, and
ethical values to protect the public. The Article concludes that the ABA
and state bars should modify existing UPL rules to both grant CPAs a
status-based exemption from UPL enforcement and accommodate
MDPs. These changes would advance the underlying policy of
protecting the public by increasing access to integrated professional
services, while preserving the core values of the legal profession.
I. UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW: REGULATION AND POLICY

Courts possess the inherent power to regulate professionals who
practice before them 23 and exercise that power by punishing those who
2
engage in UPL. 24 The premise of UPL rules is consumer protection,25
and their objective is to ensure that individuals who render legal advice
possess competence, integrity, and allegiance to clients' interests.26
Three rationales underscore the polic' of consumer protection:
competence, motivation, and remediation.
The competence rationale, which suggests that nonlawyers lack the
requisite training and skills to provide legal services, is the most
prevalent justification for UPL actions against CPAs.2 8 Part V of this
Article disproves the competence rationale's applicability to CPAs by
highlighting CPAs' unparalleled academic, technical, ethical, and
practical qualifications. The motivation rationale suggests that lawyers,
unlike other professional service providers, are motivated by public
23. In re Lemer, 197 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Nev. 2008) (citing Marfisi v. Fourth Judicial Dist.
Court, 456 P.2d 443,444 (Nev. 1969)).
24. See Melone, supra note 10, at 47.
25. See, e.g., Cambiano v. Neal, 35 S.W.3d 792, 798 (Ark. 2000) (noting that Arkansas'
UPL rules directly advance the important governmental interests of consumer protection); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2011) (stating that "limiting the practice of
law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services by unqualified
persons.").
26. In re Lerner, 197 P.3d at 1071 (citing Pioneer Title Ins. Co., 326 P.2d 406, 410 (Nev.
1958)).
27. See Melone, supra note 10, at 51-53 (citations omitted).
28. See, e.g., Gardner v. Conway, 48 N.W.2d 788, 794 (Minn. 1951) (reasoning that UPL
rules are necessary to protect the public from the harm that persons who practice law without the
proper qualifications cause); see also In re N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209, 218-19
(N.Y. App. Div. 1948) (holding that accountants do not have "the orientation" to handle legal
matters such as whether a common law spouse is eligible for married filing joint status).
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service rather than profit.29 Academics have largely discredited this
rationale, noting that even professionals with the best intentions cannot
act with exclusive fidelity to the public when their livelihoods are at
stake.3 ° Moreover, academic literature strongly suggests that the legal
profession's primary incentive for enforcing UPL rules is economic
protection. 3 1 Finally, the remediation rationale posits that lawyers are
the only professionals qualified to perform legal services because
lawyers are subject to unique standards of professional conduct, court
supervision, and sanctions for noncompliance. 32 However, the validity
of this rationale rests on numerous assumptions. First, it assumes that
lawyers in fact abide by the standards of professional conduct, that
courts actively monitor lawyers' conduct, and that courts punish those
who violate the standards. 33 Additionally, this rationale assumes that
other professions' codes of conduct are inadequate to protect clients'35
interests. 34 Serious doubt exists as to the validity of these assumptions.
The first assumption overlooks the abundance of cases involving
lawyers who misrepresent their abilities and exploit unsophisticated
clients. 36 Part V of this Article invalidates the second assumption by
highlighting the congruence between the code of professional conduct
CPAs and the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
that governs
37
Conduct.

Practically every jurisdiction within the United

States 38 has

29. See Melone, supranote 10, at 52 (citations omitted).
30. Rhode, supra note 7, at 203.
31. See Susan B. Schwab, Note, Bringing Down the Bar: Accountants Challenge
Meaning of Unauthorized Practice, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1425, 1432 n.37 (2000) (citing
numerous academic works that conclude that UPL rules are a product self-preservation rather
than public demand). A recent article in the Wall Street Journalthat questioned American UPL
rules sarcastically pointed out that "[t]he legal profession's notion that law isn't a commercial
enterprise may come as a surprise, since some lawyers now charge more than $1,000 per hour."
Jennifer Smith, Law Firms Split Over Nonlawyer Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2012, at BI
(discussing the American legal profession's refusal to follow the lead of its British and
Australian counterparts and relax UPL rules in order to "expand consumers' access to legal
services and spur competition").
32. See Melone, supra note 10, at 52 (citations omitted).
33. See id
34. Id. at 98-99.
35.

See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 147-50 (1989) (noting the prevalence of

lawyers' noncompliance with the standards of professional conduct and the infrequent
imposition of sanctions); see Melone, supra note 10, at 99 (noting the elaborate body of rules of
professional conduct that govern CPAs).
36.

See Rhode, supra note 7, at 205 (1996) (citing REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON

EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (1992), availableat

http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionnal-responsibility/resources/report-archive/mcka
yreport. html).
37. See discussion infra Part V.
38. As of April 2, 2012, every U.S. jurisdiction except the District of Columbia retains
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prohibited UPL by enacting rules similar to Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPCs). Rule 5.4 prohibits a lawyer
from (1) partnering with a nonlawyer to perform any activity that
constitutes the practice of law, (2) sharing fees with a nonlawyer, and
(3) permitting a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer
to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment.3 These rules
have devastated nonlawyer professionals' practices for several reasons.
First, neither the rule-makers nor the courts have been able to provide a
workable definition of the practice of law. 40 Courts' vague and
inconsistent interpretations of the meaning of the practice of law make it
nearly impossible for nonlawyer professionals to conform their
practices to UPL rules. Second, federal laws and federal court rules that
expressly authorize nonlawyer practice in certain areas of the law
patently conflict with the laws and court rules of states. 4 ' Where such
conflicts exist, federal law preempts state law and renders state UPL
rules inapplicable.42 Finally, by rejecting proposals to modify existing
rules and accommodate MDP, the ABA and state bars have utterly
failed to respond to an overwhelming market demand for integrated
rules similar to Rule 5.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which precludes
nonlawyers from partnering with lawyers to provide legal services and prohibits nonlawyer
ownership of firms that provide any legal services. Smith, supra note 31, at B 1.
39. Biamonte, supra note 17, at 1163; Smith, supra note 31, at 600 (citing David
Rubenstein, Big Six Poised to Enter Legal Market, Privilege, ProfessionalRules and Conflicts
Are a Barrier,MERRILL'S ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1997, at 1 (col. 1)); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011). Rule 5.4 also prohibits a lawyer from practicing with or in the form of a
for profit professional corporation or association in which corporation or association a
nonlawyer owns an interest, serves as a director or officer, or has the right to control or direct
the lawyer's professional judgment. Id.
40. See In re Maloney, 249 B.R. 71, 76 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Shortz v. Farrell, 193 A.
20, 21 (Pa. 1937) (noting the obscure boundaries of the practice of law)); David S. Caudill,
Sports and Entertainment Agents and Agent-Attorneys: Discourses and Conventions
Concerning Crossing Jurisdictionaland Professional Borders, 43 AKRON L. REv. 697, 705
(2010) (citing Kenneth L. Shropshire & Timothy Davis, The Business of Sports Agents 98, 104
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing cases that circularly define the practice of law)). See also
Memorandum from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to the Task Force on
the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/model-def/aicpa.authcheckdam.pdf (criticizing the vagueness of
the ABA's definition of the practice of law, which definition several states have adopted in their
respective rules of professional conduct).
41. See Melone, supra note 10, at 54-59 (discussing how under the U.S. Supreme Court's
1963 decision in Sperry v. Florida, I.R.S. Circular 230 preempts state UPL rules that would
otherwise preclude CPAs from providing certain tax services); see also Florida Bar v. Sperry,
140 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1962); see also 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2012) (authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to promulgate regulations governing admission of representatives to practice before it);
31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2012) (expressly authorizing CPAs to practice before the I.R.S.); Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Tax Court, Rule 200(a) (1998) (authorizing CPAs who pass
an exam to represent clients before the U.S. Tax Court).
42. See Melone, supra note 10, at 54-59.
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legal, tax, accounting, and business services.4 3 In sum, current UPL
rules unreasonably confine contemporary nonlawyer professional
practices and impede the fulfillment of public needs. As a consequence,
the legal profession has contravened the underlying policy of its own
rules of professional conduct-protection of the public. 4
II. FUTILE ATTEMPTS

TO DEFINE THE PRACTICE OF LAW

Although regulators of the legal profession readily sanction those
deemed to have engaged in UPL, statutory definitions of the practice of
law are inconsistent and lack substantive value. 45 After surveying these
categories: 46
statutes, Deborah Rhode classified them into three general
(1) statutes that altogether avoid defining the practice of law; 47 (2)
statutes containing circular definitions that categorize as the practice of
law anything that lawyers do; 48 and (3) statutes that simply list, without
clarity or precision, activities that constitute the practice of law.4 9 As a
result of these elusive statutory definitions, courts have faced the
daunting task of determining,50 on a case-by-case basis, which activities
constitute the practice of law.
43. Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 83-90 (discussing the ABA's refusal to
accommodate the multidisciplinary practice and positing that the bar "must set aside the
financial interests of the profession and ensure that the public interest is served").
44. Id. at 89.
45. Melone, supra note 10, at 52-54.
46. See Rhode, supra note 4, at 45.
47. The ABA Model Rules do not attempt to define the practice of law. MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. (2011) ("The definition of the practice of law is established by law
and varies from one jurisdiction to another.").
48. See Gary G. Sackett, An Analytic Approach to Defining the "Practice of Law" Utah's New Definition, UTAH B.J., Jan. 20, 2006, http://webster.utahbar.orgIbarjoumal/2006/01/
ananalyticapproach to defini.html (explaining that most legislatures, courts, bar associations,
and committees' attempts to define the practice of law are "circular because they define a
concept in terms of the very term 'law' or its derivatives such as 'lawyer' and 'legal.').
49. Melone, supra note 10, at 53; see also Ronald A. Landen, Comment, The Prospects
of the Accountant-Lawyer Multidisciplinary Partnership in English-Speaking Countries, 13
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 763, 774-90 (1999) (providing descriptions of how various U.S. and
international jurisdictions define the practice of law).
50. See, e.g., In re Lerner, 197 P.3d 1067, 1072 (Nev. 2008).
[T]he "practice of law" must be determined on a case-by-case basis, in light of
the "touchstone" principle that the practice of law includes activities calling for
the exercise of trained judgment in applying the general body of legal
knowledge to the specific problem of a client and recommending a course of
action.
Id. See, e.g., Taub v. Weber, 366 F.3d 966, 969 (9th Cir. 2004). On June 24, 2011, the Florida
Bar's Standing Committee on Unlicensed Practice of Law voted to decline to issue a formal
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A broad spectrum of vague court opinions underscores courts'
constant struggle to define the practice of law. 5 1 This uncertainty poses
a serious problem for contemporary CPAs because, without further
guidance, they cannot possibly conform their expanding practices to
UPL rules. 52 In addition to the lack of clarity and the inconsistency with

which courts have defined the practice of law, most of the cases
interpreting UPL rules are antiquated. These cases, which modem
courts readily cite in their decisions, date back to the 1950s and 1960s
when an entirely different
economic, legal, regulatory, and business
53
environment existed.
To ascertain whether a nonlawyer professional has engaged in UPL,
courts have historically applied tests that focus on (1) the difficulty of
the services rendered, (2) whether those services are incidental in form,
or (3) the services' impact on the recipient's legal rights.54 Under the
first test,55 courts evaluate whether the service requires "professional

judgment" concerning a "difficult or doubtful legal question[]., 56 For
example, in the 1951 case Gardnerv. Conway, the Minnesota Supreme
advisory opinion on activities which may constitute the unlicensed practice of law and voted to
continue the existing policy and review matters on a case-by-case basis. The Florida Bar Formal
Advisory Opinions available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBLawReg.nsf/9dad7bbda21
8afe885257002004833c5/34fac28eda9ca382852579ac006aff21!OpenDocument (last modified
Feb. 22, 2012). The Supreme Court of South Carolina has also rejected proposed rules regarding
the proper scope of CPAs' services in favor of a case-by-case approach. See In re Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules Proposed by the South Carolina Bar, 422 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1992).
51. See, e.g., Barbanti v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp., No. CV-06-0065-EFS, 2006 WL
3692638, at *4 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2006) ("The line between those activities included within
the definition of the practice of law and those that are not is oftentimes difficult to define.")
(quoting Bennion v. Kassler Escrow, 635 P.2d 730, 732 (Wash. 1981)).
52. See Schwab, supra note 31, at 1447 (noting that under the professional judgment test
for UPL, nonlawyers cannot avoid inadvertently engaging in UPL because the determination of
whether a difficult legal question is involved turns on the specific facts of each situation).
53. Susan Poser, Symposium, Multyurisdictional Practice For A Multyiurisdictional
Profession, 81 NEB. L. REv. 1379, 1381 (2003) (noting that in the area of UPL, "lawyers must
acknowledge the fact 'keeping antiquated laws on the books breeds public disrespect for the
law,' and that this is 'especially so where the laws relate to the conduct of lawyers, for whom
there is a professional imperative to uphold the law."')
54. Melone, supra note 10, at 59 (identifying two tests; one based on the difficulty of the
services and the other based on the form); see also Carol A. Needham, The Future of the
Profession: A Symposium on MultidisciplinaryPractice:Permitting Lawyers to Participatein
MultidisciplinaryPractices:Business as Usual or the End of the Profession as We Know It?, 84
MINN. L. REv. 1315, 1344-46 (2000) (discussing Florida Supreme Courts' continued application
of the Sperry standard, which focuses on whether the activity affects the client's legal rights).
55. See Schwab, supra note 31, at 1444 (indicating that the professional judgment
approach is the most widely-accepted method for evaluating whether a service constitutes UPL).
56. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 935 N.E.2d 1174, 1196 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (citing In re
Application of N.J. Soc. of Certified Pub. Accountants, 507 A.2d 711, 717 (N.J. 1986)); Agran
v. Shapiro, 273 P.2d 619, 623 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1954); Gardner v. Conway, 48
N.W.2d 788, 796 (Minn. 1951); Schwab, supra note 31, at 1444.
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Court ruled that a businessman who held himself out as a "tax
consultant" and advised clients on filing status, eligibility for
exemptions, and deductibility of certain expenses, engaged in UPL
because resolving these questions "obviously required legal training" on
the interpretation or application of statutes, 5 administrative
regulations
7
law.
general
and
decisions,
court
and rulings,
Relying on Gardner, a California appellate court in the 1954 case
Agran v. Shapiro denied a CPA recovery of fees because the CPA's
advice, which concerned the client's ability to carry-back a net
operating loss, constituted UPL. 58 The Agran Court reasoned that,
pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), this question rested on
whether the loss was attributable to the client's trade or business, a
difficult and doubtful question of law. 59 Courts have, as recently as
2010, continued to apply the Gardnertest in UPL cases against CPAs,
urging that "an accountant should recommend the services of an
attorney whenever
it is necessary to resolve difficult or doubtful legal
60
questions."
The Gardner test is extremely problematic and yields absurd results
for contemporary CPAs. Although most courts have recognized that the
61
preparation of a "simple" income tax return is not the practice of law,
practically every tax return that a CPA prepares involves interpretation
and application of arguably the most complex body of law in
existence. 62 For example, even the most elementary business tax return
often requires a depreciation calculation that calls for the exercise of
professional judgment.63 The preparer must determine whether I.R.C. §
263A mandates capitalization of the expense, whether to elect I.R.C. §
179 and deduct the expense currently, and within which I.R.C. § 168(e)
class the asset falls.6 4 Nevertheless, because courts continue to
misconceive the nature and scope of the tax return preparation process,
their continued use of the antiquated Gardnertest will
deem as UPL the
65
preparation of practically every business tax return.
57.
58.

Gardner,48 N.W.2d at 798.
Agran, 273 P.2d at 619.

59. Id.at 627.
60.

See Khan, 935 N.E.2d at 1196 (citing Gardner,48 N.W.2d at 796).

61. Gardner,48 N.W.2d at 798 (stating "the preparation of the income tax return was not
of itself the practice of law"); see also Agran, 273 P.2d at 627 (indicating that services involved
in the preparation of income tax returns did not constitute the practice of law).
62. See Black & Black, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing the complexity of federal taxation
in the United States); see also Melone, supra note 10, at 83-98 (providing a detailed explanation
of the tax return preparation process and the difficult legal issues that inevitably arise during tax
return preparation).
63. Id. at 87-88.
64. Id.at 88-89.
65. Id.at 83-84.
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The second test that courts employ to determine whether an activity
constitutes UPL is the "incidental services" test, 66 which the New York
Appellate Division pronounced in its 1948 decision In re New York
County Lawyers Ass 'n (commonly referred to as Bercu).67 InBercu, the
court held that an accountant, who neither prepared the client's tax
return nor audited its books, engaged in UPL when he advised the client
on the timing of a federal income tax deduction. 68 The court explained
that an accountant can advise clients on incidental questions of law that
arise in connection with auditing books or preparing tax returns, but
cannot act as a consultant to render legal advice when that advice is
independent of audit or tax return preparation services. 69 Astonishingly,
the Bercu Court actually admitted that "[a]n accountant may know more
about the tax law than some law practitioners," but proceeded to hold
that the accountant "may not.., set himself up as a public consultant on
the law of his specialty." 70 After a lengthy and perplexing discussion of
the nature of tax services, the Bercu Court refused to recognize that
accountants who qualify to practice before the U.S. Department of the
Treasury are also qualified to perform legal research and advise clients
on general tax law.
Courts and academics alike have vehemently criticized the incidental
services test as unworkable.72 While courts consistently point out that
the principal concern of UPL is protection of the public, 7 3 the operation
of the incidental services test in no way addresses that concern. Under
the incidental services test, a CPA's delivery of a particular advisory
service may or may not qualify as UPL, depending on whether he also
provides related tax return preparation or accounting services.7 4 For
66. Id. at 60; see also Schwab, supra
services test).
67. Melone, supra note 10, at 60.
68. In re N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers Ass'n, 78
af'd,Inre Bercu, 87 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1949).
backed N.Y. City excise taxes. Id.
69. Id.at 220-21.
70. Id. at 217-18.
71. Id. at 217-20.
72. Melone, supra note 10, at 64. The

note 31, at 1447-48 (discussing the incidental

N.Y.S.2d 209, 215, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1948),
The deduction related to the client's payment of

Agran court expressly rejected the "incidental

services" test set out in In re N.Y Cnty. Lawyers Ass 'n, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 216, aft'd, In re Bercu,

87 N.E.2d 451 (1949), stating "[t]he incidental test has no value except in the negative sense
that if the furnishing of the legal service is the primary business of the actor such activity is the
practice of law, even though such service is of an elementary nature." Id.at 625. The Agran
court further highlighted that the incidental services test yields an illogical result when a layman
provides any service that is remotely legal in nature and not incidental to his regular calling, and
thus "ignores the interest of the public as the controlling determinant." Id.
73. See Herzog, supranote 12, at 358.
74. See Melone, supra note 10, at 64 (illustrating the illogical results that the incidental
services test produces).
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example, a CPA who researches and opines on whether his client can
deduct as a business expense the cost of lawn maintenance, but does not
prepare the client's tax return, engages in UPL. If, however, the CPA
also prepares the client's tax return and, based on his research, takes a
tax position by deducting that expense, the CPA has not, under the
incidental services test, engaged in UPL. These divergent results
illustrate how the incidental services test elevates the form of services
over their substance and does nothing to ensure a practitioner's
competence to render the services in question.75
A third test that courts utilize in UPL cases looks to whether the
service "affects important rights of a person under the law" and whether
an "average citizen" lacks sufficient "legal skill and knowledge of the
law" to protect those rights.76 The Supreme Court of Florida first
pronounced this test in the 1962 case FloridaBar v. Sperry.77 Twentyeight years later, in the 1990 case FloridaBar re Advisory OpinionNonlawyer Preparationof Pension Plans, the Supreme Court of Florida
reaffirmed the applicability of this test, holding that tax advice
concerning whether the I.R.C. will treat a pension plan as "qualified"
for federal income tax purposes constitutes the practice of law and thus
requires an attorney to handle or supervise the matter. 78 The court
reasoned that an improper submittal of a pension plan to the I.R.S. could
deprive an employer of valuable aid in determining how79 to proceed with
its pension plan, or even disqualify the plan altogether.
The Sperry test, like other UPL tests, is unrealistic. First, the
''average citizen" standard for determining whether protection of a
person's legal rights requires a lawyer is preposterously overbroad. As
some academics have pointed out, ascertaining the amount of legal
knowledge that an "average citizen" possesses is practically
75.
76.

Id.
See Needham, supra note 54, at 1345 (citing Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 591

(U.S. 1963)).
77. Fla. Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), vacated on other grounds,
Sperry, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
[I]f the giving of such advice and performance of such services affect important

rights of a person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights
and property of those advised and served requires that the persons giving such
advice possess legal skill and a knowledge of the law greater than that
possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of such advice and the
performance of such services by one for another as a course of conduct
constitute the practice of law.
Sperry, 140 So. 2d at 591.

78.

Fla. Bar Re Advisory Op.-Nonlawyer Preparation of Pension Plans, 571 So. 2d 430,

441 (Fla. 1990).

79.

Id.
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impossible. 8 Moreover, the federal tax regulations, which expressly
authorize nonlawyer CPAs to practice before the I.R.S., 8' provide that
such authorized practice includes "all matters connected with a
presentation to the [I.R.S.] ... relating to a client's rights, privileges or
liabilities under laws or regulations administered by the [I.R.S.] ' ' 8Y In
sum, misconceptions of the nature and scope of tax and accounting
services have led the Supreme Court of Florida to develop yet another
unworkable test for UPL claims against CPAs. Virtually any accounting
or tax service clearly affects a client's important legal rights, the
protection of which certainly requires knowledge beyond that of
an average citizen. For example, Congress has granted taxpayers who
meet certain requirements the legal right to deductions to arrive at, and
credits against, their U.S. tax liabilities.83 To determine whether a
taxpayer is entitled to a deduction or credit, a tax return preparer must
ascertain the legal standard that qualifies the taxpayer for the deduction
or credit, assess any potential limitation on the deduction or credit
amount, and assess whether the taxpayer, based on his circumstances,
has met that legal standard. The mere fact that most sophisticated
taxpayers engage CPAs to perform this analysis evidences that an
average citizen lacks the requisite knowledge to make such
determinations.
Unfortunately, modem courts' continued application of these
antiquated tests has led to results that are incommensurate with the
purported policy of UPL rules. For example, in the 2010 case Kahn v.
BDO Seidman, LLP, an Illinois appellate court applied the Gardner
professional judgment test to conclude that tax advice concerning
certain tax avoidance strategies and the related preparation of the
client's income tax returns constituted the practice of law. 84 The court
80. See, e.g., Needham, supra note 54, at 1347-48.
81.

See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2012) (authorizing nonlawyer CPAs, enrolled agents, and

enrolled actuaries to practice before the I.R.S.).
82.

31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a) (2012)

(emphasis added). Under this broad regulation,

preparation of federal tax returns constitutes "practice before the I.R.S." Herzog, supra note 12,
at 369. In addition, tax planning advice likely satisfies the "connected with presentations before
the I.R.S." requirement because the taxpayer will eventually report the proposed transaction on
his tax return. See id.

83. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162 (authorizing a deduction for "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business"); see also I.R.C. §
901 (authorizing a foreign tax credit against a taxpayer's U.S. Income tax liability, subject to the
complex limitations imposed by I.R.C. § 904, for "any income, war profits, and excess profits
taxes paid or accrued during the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession of the
United States.").
84.

See Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 935 N.E.2d 1174, 1196-97 (111. App. Ct. 2010). In

Kahn, the court actually found for the CPA firm because the firm had disclaimed that "the
preparation of the client's income-tax returns will raise difficult or doubtful legal questions and
that the legal evaluations inherent in the proposed tax returns that [the CPA firm] prepares for
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reasoned that the preparation of these returns raised difficult or doubtful
legal questions that required review and approval of a qualified
lawyer. 5 Although reported decisions like Kahn often provide extreme
examples of CPAs pushing the limits of UPL rules, 86 courts' application
of antiquated and overbroad tests deters CPAs from offering certain
services for which they are arguably more qualified than attorneys to
render. 87 For instance, a survey of reported case law suggests that most
courts have held that a CPA who renders tax advice independent of
other tax or accounting services engages in UPL.88 Thus, unless the
ABA and state bars revise the current UPL rules, the rules will continue
to impose an unwarranted restraint on contemporary CPAs' practices.
III. MECHANISMS TO OVERRIDE STATE UPL RULES
Courts have provided CPAs with some relief from troublesome state
UPL rules through the doctrine of federal preemption, the U.S. Tax
Court's Rules of Practice and Procedure, and the extension to CPAs of
the tax practitioner-client privilege. The following discussion addresses
how these mechanisms prevent unreasonable results by overriding state
UPL rules in cases that involve CPAs. The practical outcomes that
result from federal preemption, the operation of the U.S. Tax Court
Rules, and extension to CPAs of the practitioner-client privilege support
granting CPAs a status-based exemption from state UPL rules.
A. FederalPreemption: CPAs 'Representation of Clients
Before the I.R.S.
Grounded in constitutional jurisprudence, the doctrine of federal
preemption provides CPAs with a limited status-based exemption from
overbroad state UPL rules. The Constitution of the United States
the client are merely tentative or provisional until they are validated by a law firm." Id. The
disclaimer effectively removed the services from the arbitration provision's coverage, which
arbitration provision the clients sought to invoke. Id.
85. Id.
86. Other courts have recently applied these same tests to prohibit CPAs from advising
clients on choice of entity decisions, Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Verne, 788 N.E.2d 1064 (Ohio
2003), filing standard incorporation documents, N.Y.Cnty. BarAss 'n v. Kirk, No. 99-SU-0077207, 2002 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 111 (Pa. County Ct. Dec. 20, 2002), and drafting estate
planning documents, such as wills and trust agreements, In re Estep, 933 A.2d 763, 766 (Del.
2007).

87. Farrell, supra note 16, at 603 (noting that the value of the rules of professional
conduct is dependent upon their interpretation); see also infra Part V.
88.

Black & Black, supra note 6, at 30-31 (2004) (discussing various cases in which

courts held that tax advice, which was not incidental to other services, constituted the practice of
law).
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fashioned a legal system premised on federalism by vesting in two
distinct levels of government, the federal government and the
government of each of the several states, 89 overlapping authority to
legislate. 90 When the federal government acts in an area of the law in
which state governments have previously legislated, or vice versa,
conflicts inevitably arise. 91 Anticipating these conflicts, the framers of
the Constitution included in Article VI the Supremacy Clause which
dictates that federal law "shall be the supreme law of the land.''92 Thus,
if a state law conflicts with federal law, federal law controls and renders
the state law inoperative. 93 Although Congress may expressly preempt
state law, the preemption doctrine also applies if the federal
government's actions impliedly preempt state law. Implied federal
preemption can exist in two circumstances: when a direct conflict exists
between state and federal law (conflict preemption), and when, within a
particular field, federal regulation is so pervasive that no room remains
for states to regulate (field preemption).94 Under the Supreme Court's
preemption jurisprudence, conflict preemption exists when "it is
impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal
requirements." 95 Alternatively, field preemption exists when a state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 96 Thus, a state law can survive
federal preemption only if "both [the state and federal] regulations can
without impairing the federal superintendence of the
be enforced
97
field."

89. For the purpose of the following discussion, this Note includes in any reference to
state law, the law of any U.S. territory or possession.
90. Courtney Gaughan, Note, Some More Watters, Please: The Dodd-FrankAct's New
Preemption Standards Lighten Consumers' Wallets, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1459, 1463-64 (2011)
(citing Mary J. Davis, On Preemption, CongressionalIntent, and Conflict of Laws, 66 U. PITr.
L. REV. 181, 182 (2004)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
91. Davis, supra note 90, at 182.
92. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). The Supremacy Clause states: "[tihis
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2.
93. David B. Spence & Paula Murray, The Law, Economics, and Politics of Federal
Preemption Jurisprudence: A Quantitative Analysis, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1125, 1132-33 (1999)
(discussing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 38 (1824)).
94. See Gaughan, supra note 90, at 1464-65 (discussing the various tests for conflict and
field preemption).
95. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) and quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
96. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Hines, 312
U.S. at 67) (internal quotations omitted).
97. John P.C. Duncan, The Course of Federal Pre-Emption of State Banking Law, 18
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The Supreme Court of the United States applied the federal
preemption doctrine in the context of nonlawyers practicing before
federal agencies in its 1963 landmark decision Sperry v. Florida. In
Sperry, the Florida Bar initiated proceedings to enjoin from preparing
and prosecuting patent applications a nonlawyer patent practitioner who
was registered to practice before the U.S. Patent Office (USPO). 99 On
certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, although the State of
Florida had a substantial interest in regulating the practice of law, state
UPL laws must yield to federal statutes that authorize nonlawyers to
perform particular functions. 00 The Court reasoned that, despite the
Florida Bar's determination that the practitioner's patent services
constituted UPL, the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
prohibited the state from denying the practitioner his federally-granted
right to perform those patent services.' m
Like the federal statutes and regulations that granted the patent
practitioner in Sperry the right to prepare and prosecute patent
applications before the USPO, 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) expressly authorizes
CPAs to represent clients before the I.R.S.' Additionally 31 U.S.C.j
330 empowers the Treasury to regulate those who practice before it.
Exercising its regulatory power, the Treasury promulgated Circular 230
to interpret and generally govern practice before the I.R.S.' 0 4 Circular
230 broadly defines "practice before the I.R.S." to include many of the
tax services that state courts have1 66
105 as illustrated in Part II of this
Article, held to constitute UPL.
Under the regulation, the term
"practice" means "all matters connected with a presentation" to the
I.R.S. 10 7 and "presentations" include "preparing documents; filing
documents; corresponding and communicating with the [I.R.S.];
rendering written advice with respect to any entity, transaction, plan or
arrangement, or other plan or arrangement having a potential for tax
ANN. REV. BANKING L. 221, 232 (1999) (quoting Fla. Lime, 373 U.S. at 142)(internal
quotations omitted).
98. Sperryv. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (U.S. 1963).
99. Id. at 381-82.
100. Id.at 383-84.
101. Id.at 385. The Court explained that Congress authorized the Commissioner of
Patents to "prescribe regulations governing the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or
other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Patent Office, 35 U.S.C. §
31, and the Commissioner, pursuant to § 31, has provided by regulation that 'an applicant for
patent ...

Office in
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

may be represented by an attorney or agent authorized to practice before the Patent

patent cases."' Id.(citing 37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2011) (emphasis added)).
5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (2006).
31 U.S.C. § 330 (2006). This statute also references 5 U.S.C. § 500(c). Id.
See 31 C.F.R. § 10.0(a) (2011).
Id. § 10.2(a)(4).
See discussion supra Part II.
31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2011).
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avoidance or evasion;
and representing a client at conferences, hearings,
10 8
and meetings." '
Although Circular 230 does not distinguish between attorneys and
CPAs,' 0 9 it does state that "[n]othing in the regulations in this part may
be construed as authorizing persons not members of the bar to practice
law."' 11 Some academics and courts have interpreted this provision as
reserving for states the power to enforce their UPL rules and prohibit
nonlawyers from providing certain tax advisory services. 11 1 However,
Circular 230 deliberately provides a broad, non-exclusive list of
authorized tax services that include "rendering written advice with
respect to any entity, transaction, plan or arrangement."' 1 2 In addition,
tax advice on future transactions likely qualifies as a service "connected
with presentations before the I.R.S." because the taxpayer will13
eventually report the proposed transaction on his tax return."
Therefore, the more rational view is that, through the application of
Sperry, federal statutes and regulations' 1 4 completely preempt states
from regulating the provision of tax services by CPAs.115
The Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted this broad view on
108. Id.
109. Id. § 10.3(d).
110. Id. § 10.32.
111. See Black & Black, supra note 6, at 4 (suggesting that the Secretary of the Treasury
has not given CPAs the right to "practice" before the I.R.S., but only the right to "practice
accounting" before the I.R.S. (e.g., to explain the financial statements they had prepared)).
Black interpreted the provision that "nothing contained in the Code of Federal Regulations was
to be construed to allow a nonlawyer to practice law" to literally negate the rest of the authority
mentioned in the text above, which authority clearly and unequivocally grants CPAs the right to
practice before the I.R.S. Id. In Agran v. Shapiro, the court held that the Treasury intended this
provision of Circular 230 to prevent federal preemption of state UPL law, concluding that an
accountant who was admitted to practice as an enrolled agent before the I.R.S. engaged in UPL
when he advised his client on the deductibility of a net operating loss. Agran v. Shapiro, 273
P.2d 619 at 630; see also Petition of Kearney, 63 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 1953) (denying an attorney's
petition to engage in the practice of law as federal tax counsel, limiting his appearances to cases
before the federal court even though the attorney was a member in good standing of the bar of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Tax Court, and was authorized to practice before the U.S.
Treasury Department).
112. 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2011).
113. See Herzog, supra note 12, at 369 (citing Melone, supra note 10, at 57).
114. 5 U.S.C. § 500(c)(2011); 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2011); 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4)(2011).
115. 5 U.S.C. § 500(c) (2011); 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2011); 31 C.F.R. § 10.2(a)(4) (2011); see
Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (holding that federal statutes and regulations
admitting nonlawyers to practice before the U.S. Patent Office preempt state laws forbidding
unauthorized practice of law); see Black & Black, supra note 6, at 53 (stating that Circular 230
grants a privilege to "tax practitioners" when they are providing tax advice); see Nnona, supra
note 6, at 898 (noting that Congress, by enacting 5 U.S.C. § 500, authorized CPAs to represent
clients in tax matters and that this federal statute, which remains the law, preempts any contrary
state law).
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federal preemption in the 1980 case Joffe v. Wilson. 116 In Joffe, the court
held that a CPA who represented his client to dispute with the I.R.S. a
deficiency assessment during the settlement and administrative appeal
processes did not engage in UPL because the CPA was entitled,
pursuant to Circular 230, to "practice before the I.R.S."'1 17 Explaining
the logic behind this position, the Massachusetts Superior Court in
Palmerv. Ernst & Young, LLP stated:
It would make little sense to find that a CPA or tax planner who
was authorized to practice before the IRS was not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law when he argued with the IRS (and
litigated administratively within the IRS) on behalf of his client
about the legal interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, but
was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when he gave
the tax advice to the client that became the subject of the dispute
with the IRS. For all practical purposes, a CPA or tax planner
authorized to practice before the IRS may provide advice to a
client regarding tax law, even as to arcane matters of tax law,
of law, provided he
without engaging in the unauthorized practice
8
does not hold himself out as an attorney.11
In sum, the logical results that flow from a broad application of
Sperry to UPL cases that involve tax services strongly support the
reality that CPAs deserve a status-based exemption from UPL rules.
B. Tax Litigation: CPAs' Representation of Clients Before the U.S. Tax
Court and Tax Practitioner-ClientPrivilege
The federal statutes and regulations discussed above expressly
authorize CPAs to practice before the I.R.S., a federal administrative
agency. The federal government has also allowed CPAs to represent
clients in the U.S. Tax Court (Tax Court)' 19 and has extended to CPAs
the practitioner-client privilege, a privilege traditionally confined to
attorneys. 120 A brief history of the Tax Court's evolution is helpful in
116. Joffe v. Wilson, 407 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Mass. 1980).
117. Id. The court also noted that, when the time came to commence an action in Federal
District Court, the CPA appropriately engaged an attorney whom the CPA assisted during the
Federal District Court proceedings. Id.
118. Palmer v. Ernst & Young, LLP, No. 97747, 2007 Mass. Super. LEXIS 109, at *15-16
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2007).
119. Practice before the I.R.S. is distinct from practice before the U.S. Tax Court. Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., 1-4 TAx CONTROVERSIES: AuDITS, INVESTIGATIONS, TRIALS § 4.06 (2000).
120. See Michael Wilson, Note, Careful What You Wish For: The Tax Practitioner-Client
PrivilegeEstablishedby the InternalRevenue Service RestructuringandReform Act of 1998, 51
FLA. L. REV.319, 320-22 (1999) (providing a history of the attorney-client privilege).
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understanding how the federal government has recognized CPAs'
unique role in tax litigation.
Congress established the U.S. Board of Tax Appeals (Board), the
predecessor to the Tax Court, when it passed the Revenue Act of
1924.121 In doing so, Congress recognized the need for an independent
agency within the executive branch that consisted of "Members" who
possessed the specialized knowledge to handle increasingly complex tax
issues. 122 In 1942, Congress renamed the Board "The Tax Court" and
changed the title of each Member to Judge. 123 Finally, Congress passed
the Tax Reform Act of 1969, converting the Tax Court from an
administrative agency into a judicial court of record under Article I of
the U.S. Constitution.124 By converting the Tax Court from an
administrative agency into an Article I judicial court, Congress opened
the door for CPAs to litigate tax cases in trial court. 12 5 Nevertheless,
under any of the tests discussed in Part II of this Article, a CPA who
represents a client before a judicial tribunal
such as the Tax Court most
126
law.
of
practice
the
in
engages
certainly
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed whether nonlawyer CPAs
could represent clients before the Tax Court's predecessor in the 1926
case Goldsmith v. U.S. Board of Tax Appeals.12 7 In Goldsmith, the
Board rejected a New York CPA's application for admission to practice
before it because the CPA had allegedly rendered improper advice to his
clients. 128 The CPA filed a writ of mandamus to compel the Board to
enroll him as an attorney with the right to practice and to enjoin the
Board from interfering with his representation of clients.
The
Supreme Court held that, because the Board properly prescribed rules
granting licensed CPAs the legal right to practice before it,
constitutional due process entitled the CPA to notice and an opportunity
to contest denial of his admission. 13 In summary, the Goldsmith Court
121. See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(a), 43 Stat. 253, 336.
122. See id.; see also USTaxCourt.gov, About the Court, http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/about
htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2012) (explaining that Tax Court judges "have expertise in the tax
laws and apply that expertise in a manner to ensure that taxpayers are assessed only what they
owe . . ").
123. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957.
124. See I.R.C. § 7441 (2012); see also USTaxCourt.gov, supra note 122.
125. See Schwab, supra note 31, at 1450 (classifying representing clients in appearances
before tribunals as an "act ... commonly understood to be the practice of law").
126. See supra Part II.
127. See Herzog supra note 12, at 363-64 (discussing permissible activities by CPAs that
do not constitute the practice of law).
128. Goldsmith v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 119-20 (1926).
129. Id. at 119.
130. Id. at 122-24. The Court ultimately denied the CPAs writ of mandamus because he
never sought a hearing after the Board denied his admission. Id. at 124.

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 23

recognized that, pursuant to the Board's rules of procedure, licensed
CPAs were qualified and had the legal right to represent clients before
the Board.' 3 '
Similar to the rules that granted CPAs a status-based right to practice
before the Board, 132 Rule 200(a) of the U.S. Tax Court Rules of Practice
and Procedure (Tax Court Rules) authorizes nonlawyers who pass an
admission exam to practice before the Tax Court.' 3 3 Therefore, a
nonlawyer CPA admitted to practice before the Tax Court can represent
34
a taxpayer at trial if the taxpayer chooses to litigate in Tax Court.'
Interestingly, at the trial level, a taxpayer may litigate a tax controversy
against the I.R.S. in one of three fora: the Tax Court, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, or Federal District Court. 135 The procedure for litigating
in Tax Court allows a taxpayer to contest a tax liability at trial without
first paying any of the asserted deficiency.' 36 In contrast, both the
Federal District Courts and the Court of Federal Claims require the
taxpayer to first pay a portion of the alleged deficiency, and then sue for
38
a refund. 137 Although a CPA may represent a taxpayer in Tax Court,'
131. See id. at 122. Significantly, the Court noted that, although at the time of the case, the
Board was an administrative agency rather than a "court," the reasoning behind the opinion and
the holding would also apply to courts that admit individuals to practice before them. Id. at 12223 ("The fact that in the Manning Case the body was called a Court and that here the Board is
an executive tribunal does not make the decision inapplicable.").
132. Id. at 119.
133. Tax Ct. R. 200(a)(3). The Tax Court will admit nonlawyers who file an application,
pass the Tax Court's examination, and pay the appropriate fee. David M. Fogel, Non-lawyers'
Handbookfor Assisting Clients with their Tax Court Cases, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., June-July
2005, at 55-61. The Tax Court examination is offered once every other year and covers the
following subjects: the Tax Court rules (25%), the Federal Rules of Evidence (25%), Federal
Tax Law (40%), and Legal Ethics (10%). Id.
134. See Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing
Legal Services from Lawyers in a MultidisciplinaryPartnership,13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217,
253-54 (1998) (citing I.R.C. § 7452 (stating that "[n]o qualified person shall be denied
admission to practice before the Tax Court because of his failure to be a member of any
profession or calling.")).
135.

BORIS I. BITrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES

115.1 (3d ed. 1999). The author notes that in some limited circumstances, a
AND GIFTS
taxpayer may litigate tax issues against the IRS in federal Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. § 505.
See, e.g., In re Premo, 116 B.R. 515 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990). Because the taxpayer may
litigate a tax issue in Bankruptcy Court only if he is involved in bankruptcy proceedings,
Bankruptcy Court is not truly an alternative forum. See Shu-Yi Oei, Rethinking the Jurisdiction
of Bankruptcy Courts Over Post-Confirmation Federal Tax Liabilities: Towards a New
Jurisprudence of 11 U.S.C. § 505, 19 AKRON TAX J. 49, 49-50 (2004) (providing a detailed
discussion of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction over federal tax liabilities). Thus, this Note's
discussion of alternative fora for tax litigation is limited to the Tax Court, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, and Federal District Court.
136. BITrKER & LoKKEN, supra note 135.
137. Id.; Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 78 S. Ct. 1064, 1079, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1165
(1958), aff'd on reh'g, 362 U.S. 145, 80 S. Ct. 630, 4 L. Ed. 2d 623 (190). Shore v. United
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he cannot, under the current rules, represent
39 a taxpayer in Federal
District Court or the Court of Federal Claims.'
The inconsistency of authorizing CPAs to represent clients in tax
matters before both the I.R.S. and the Tax Court, but not before the
Court of Federal Claims or the U.S. District Courts, yields illogical
results. First, during its proceedings, the Tax Court applies the same
Federal Rules of Evidence as any other federal court. 140 Hence, both the
substantive law and the rules of evidence are identical regardless of
which court a taxpayer chooses. Nonetheless, because a CPA may
represent a tax litigation client only in Tax Court, a client who chooses
to engage a CPA rather than an attorney is limited in his choice of
forum. Moreover, notwithstanding the Tax Court Rules, UPL rules deny
clients continuity in representation. Because any representation at the
trial court level would, under the tests described in Part II, constitute
UPL,141 a CPA who has represented a client during an administrative
proceeding, such as an appeals conference, cannot continue to represent
that client if the case proceeds to trial. Finally, once admitted to practice
before the Tax Court, the Tax Court Rules require a practitioner to
"carry on [his] practice in accordance with the letter and spirit of
the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the American Bar
Association."' 14 2 However, a CPA who is authorized to and in fact
practices before the Tax Court cannot possibly comply with both the
MRPCs and the Tax Court Rules because the MRPCs prohibit
nonlawyers from practicing law, sharing fees with lawyers, and owning
43
an interest in any entity that engages in the practice of law. 1
A final example of Congress's recognition that CPAs play a distinct
role in the litigation arena is its recent extension to CPAs of the tax
practitioner-client evidentiary privilege. This privilege mirrors the
attorney-client privilege, which protects communications between an
attorney and his client by prohibiting disclosure both during discovery
and at trial of matters that a client conveys to the attorney for the
States, 9 F.3d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
138. TAX CT.R. 200(a).

139. See R.C.F.C. § 83.1 (requiring that an attorney represent a client before the Court of
Federal Claims); see generally 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2012) (providing the general rule that either
the party or their "counsel" appear before a federal court).
140. I.R.C. § 7453; Am. Police & Fire Found. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 699, 707 n.3
(1983); Malinowski v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 1120, 1125 (1979).
141. See Joffe v. Wilson, 407 N.E.2d 342, 343-45 (Mass. 1980) (holding that a CPA, who

represented his client through the administrative tax controversy process, properly relinquished
to an attorney complete control over the matter when the time came to commence an action in
the Federal District Court because the CPA "acknowledged that he was not qualified to appear,
and that an attorney must be retained to handle the proceedings").
142.
143.

TAX CT. R. 201(a).
See Daly, supra note 133, at 254.
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purpose of obtaining legal advice. 144 In 1998, Congress recognized the
critical role that CPAs play in tax litigation by enacting
I.R.C. § 7525.145 This statute created the new practitioner-client
privilege for those tax professionals admitted to practice before the
I.R.S. (i.e., CPAs). 146 Prior to the statute's enactment, courts avoided
extending privilege to accountant-client communications by holding, in
stark contrast to UPL cases, that CPAs' professional advice did not
constitute "legal advice."' 147 With I.R.C. § 7525 in place, federal law
now affords CPAs, by virtue of their licensure, essentially the same
that that common law
protections over client communications
148
attorneys.
to
only
granted
historically
In summary, Circular 230 authorizes CPAs to practice before the
I.R.S. In addition, a clear trend of allowing CPAs to provide traditional
legal services, such as representation before judicial tribunals, has
144. Wilson, supra note 120, at 321.
145. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 110 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7525 (1998)
(amended 2004)) (noting congressional recognition of the key role that accountants and
nonlawyers who practice before the I.R.S. play in tax controversy work).
146. Id.
147. See Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: What Tax Advice Privilege?, 98 TAx NoTEs
TODAY 128-33 (1998); see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987)
("[l]nformation ... transmitted . . . for the purpose of preparing ...

tax returns . . .is not

privileged information."); see United States v. Gurtner, 474 F.2d 297, 298-99 (9th Cir.
1973) (holding that tax return preparation is not the rendering of legal advice); see Canaday v.
United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 n.7 (8th Cir. 1966). However, some courts have held that tax
return preparation involves some legal advice, but the privilege was vitiated because there was
either no expectation of confidentiality or there had been a waiver of the privilege. See United
States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485, 487-88 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that information transmitted
for use on a tax return has no expectation of confidentiality); see also Dorokee Co. v. United
States, 697 F.2d 277, 279-80 (10th Cir. 1983).
Even those courts holding that the attorney-client privilege can arise from the
preparation of income tax returns do not apply the privilege to documents given
by a client to an attorney for inclusion in the client's income tax return, because
such information is obviously not intended to remain confidential.
Id. at 280. See also United States v. Cote, 456 F.2d 142, 145 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding the
client taxpayer waived privilege not only as to the information on the tax return but also as to
the details underlying the information because taxpayer's accountant transcribed the information
from work papers onto amended tax returns).
148. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 110 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7525(a)(1)
(1998) (amended 2004)). The author acknowledges that some limitations that do not apply to
ordinary attorney-client privilege apply to the practitioner-client privilege. In addition, a deep
body of law has developed on the intricacies of accountant-client privilege. However, these
topics are beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the purpose of introducing the tax
practitioner-client privilege is to illustrate Congress's recognition of CPAs vital role in
contemporary tax planning and civil litigation. For a detailed discourse on the tax practitionerclient privilege, see Wilson, supra note 120.
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developed at the federal level. Finally, Congress's recent extension to
CPAs of the practitioner-client privilege evidences the federal
government's recognition that CPAs are uniquely qualified to provide
certain legal services and deserve similar protections that the law has
traditionally afforded attorneys. As such, the ABA and state regulators
should align UPL rules with existing federal law, enabling CPAs to
render comprehensive tax services without fear of engaging in UPL.149
IV. MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE

Legal scholars suggest that multidisciplinary practice, commonly
referred to as MDP, is one of the most important issues that the legal
profession faces today. 150 MDP is the joint practice between lawyers
and nonlawyer professionals in which the two integrate their respective
fields of expertise to offer comprehensive advice on multifaceted
matters.151 In the United States, UPL rules that prohibit partnerships and
profit-sharing arrangements between lawyers and nonlawyers have
historically prevented the formation of MDPs.152 However it is difficult
to ignore the benefits that MDPs offer.
The modern business environment is extremely dynamic and
continues to experience rapid globalization. 153 Despite this reality, U.S.
law firms, under their current structure, arguably lack the capacity to
149. See Herzog, supra note 12, at 369 (suggesting that the time is ripe to grant CPAs
access to represent clients in tax disputes before local tribunals).
150. See Nnona, supra note 6, at 853; see also John H. Matheson, The Future of the
Profession.A Symposium On MultidisciplinaryPractice:Not "If' but "How": Reflecting on the
ABA Commission's Recommendations on MultidisciplinaryPractice, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1269,
1269 (2000).
151. See Nnona, supra note 6, at 852 n.3 (defining the term "multidisciplinary practice");
see also Luppino, supra note 6, at 110-12 (describing the nature of MDPs). The Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice defined MDP as:
[A] partnership, professional corporation, or other association or entity that
includes lawyers and non-lawyers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the
delivery of legal services to a client(s) other than the organization itself or that
holds itself out to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It
includes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more other
professional firms to provide services, and there is a direct or indirect sharing
of profits as part of the arrangement.
Carol McLean Brewer et al., Con: Facingthe Tide of Change, 74 FLA. B.J. 13, 39 n.4 (2000).
152. Luppino, supra note 6, at 119. The primary impediment to MDPs is most states'
adoption of rules similar to Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional conduct. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011).
153. Biamonte, supra note 17, at 1165-66 (2001).
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address the broad spectrum of issues that clients face. 154 MDPs operate
as "one-stop-shops" to provide clients with integrated accounting,
business, tax and legal services at a lower cost than other
alternatives. 5?"These firms can minimize the cost of providing services
by delegating functions internally rather than paying market prices, and
by taking advantage of economies of scale and scope.' 56 Furthermore,
professionals' diverse expertise enables MDP teams to identify both
legal and non-legal issues that affect the client.' 57 Finally, MDPs
minimize the risk that lawyers will render incompetent advice in areas
that require specialized knowledge and skill.1 58
Beginning in the late 1980s, the Big Four' 59 accounting firms
identified the global market for legal services as a promising business
opportunity and sought to expand their service lines into areas
"remarkably similar to those traditionally offered by law firms."' 60
Their strategy was clear: "carve a niche in the legal services area that
compliments [their] existing core business . . . ," namely corporate law,
finance, labor law, estate planning for high net-worth individuals,
mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, intellectual property,
and employment law.' 6 1 Because global accounting firms offer clients
this expansive range of expertise, they have been largely successful in
penetrating the European and Australian legal markets where
professional regulators have welcomed the formation of MDPs. 162 For
154. Id.
155. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 117-27 (discussing at length the benefits
of and demand for MDPs).
at 120.
156. See id.
157. Seeid. at 121.
158. See id. at 122.
159. Although many sources refer to these as the "Big Five" or "Big Six," only four of
these multinational accounting firms survive today, KPMG, Ernst & Young,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Deloitte. See Katherine S. Pell, The New Enforcement Paradigm
for Big FourAccounting Firms, 78 TEMP L. REV. 775,775 n. 1 (2005).
160. See John H. Matheson, Governance Issues in the Multidisciplinary Corporate
PracticeFirm, 69 U. C1N.L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2001); see also Daly, supra note 134, at 219-20.
161. See id.at 234-35 (quoting the lead partner of KPMG's International Tax Centre in
Amsterdam and providing the strategic perspective of partners from Arthur Anderson and
PricewaterhouseCoopers).
162. See Daly, supra note 134, at 219 (noting the extraordinary growth of MDPs in
Europe); see also Nnona, supra note 6, at 918 (discussing the liberalized regulatory scheme in
Europe); see Matheson, supra note 150, at 1300 ("These larger accounting firms, taking
advantage of the pro-MDP regulatory system overseas, have significant legal practices
throughout Europe, with lawyers on staff or attached to the accounting firms through some
variety of contractual obligations. In some European markets, these accounting firms are already
among the largest providers of legal services for businesses."). In addition,
PricewaterhouseCoopers has successfully become Australia's largest multi-disciplinary
partnership (MDP). PWC Australia Legal Services, http://www.pwc.com.au/legal (last visited
Apr. 16, 2012).

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OFLA WAND CPAS

example, as of 2000, Big Four accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers
(PWC) employed more than 1600 non-tax lawyers who served its
clients on integrated teams, making PWC, at that time, the third largest
law practice in the world. 16 3 PWC currently boasts its status as
Australia's largest MDP, "provid[ing] . .. clients with seamless access

to specialist legal and non-legal
expertise across a broad spectrum of
' 64
commercial disciplines."'
Like its European and Australian counterparts, the U.S. professional
services market has an extraordinary demand for MDPs. A survey that
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Corporate Counsel
Association released indicated that seventy percent of Americans favor
changing legal professional rules to allow lawyers and other
professionals to work together in the same firm. 65 Despite a strong
push by accounting firms and the market,166 and the ABA's own
acknowledgment that nonlawyers are already providing integrated
services that are practically impossible to categorize under current UPL
rules,1 67 the ABA and
state bars have continuously refused to
68
accommodate MDPs. 1
In August 1999, the ABA House of Delegates rejected a general
recommendation of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice that
the legal profession allow lawyers and nonlawyers to offer services

163.

See Matheson, supra note 150, at 1274. The American Lawyer reported in November

1998 that PWC employed 1663 nontax lawyers in 39 countries; Arthur Andersen employed
1500 in 27 countries; KPMG employed 988 in an unidentified number of countries; Ernst &
Young employed 851 in 32 countries; and Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu employed 586 in 14
countries. Daly, supra note 134, at 232.
164. PWC Australia Legal Services, supra note 162.
165. Diane Hartman, Give Us Your Opinion on Multidisciplinary Practice ("MDP"), 29
COLORADO LAW. 31 (2000), available at http://www.cobar.org/tcl/tcl-articles.cfin?articleid=

929.
166. Attractive employment opportunities for attorneys abroad, and the availability of
comprehensive integrated business and legal services abroad could shift the labor market for
attorneys and the professional services market away from the United States and into more liberal
countries. Paul D. Paton, MultidisciplinaryPractice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 2193, 2198 (2010), available at

http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol78/iss5/4. See, e.g., Working Overseas-A Reality Check,
Ernest Schaal (Oct. 2008), http://apps.americanbar.org/lpm/lpt/articles/mkt 10081 .shtrnl.

167. See Luppino, supra note 6, at 132-33 (quoting the then President of the ABA, Alfred
P. Carlton, who stated, "the revelation that there are an increasing number of situations where
nonlawyers are providing services that are difficult to categorize under current statutes and case
law as being, or not being, the delivery of legal services").
168.

See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 149 (describing the ABA's rejection of

proposals to facilitate MDPs and explaining that the ABA's action "will benefit large
multinational corporations who will continue to receive multidisciplinary services, and
disadvantage low- and middle-income clients who will be unable to readily gain access to such
services.").
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through MDPs. 169 Instead, the ABA House of Delegates opted to defer
changing the rules until additional study demonstrated that MDPs would
serve the public interest. 170 Meanwhile, flying in the face of any
progress toward more flexible rules, in February 2000, the House of
Delegates adopted a resolution to encourage state and local bars to
investigate and prosecute UPL. 17 In May 2000, the Commission on
Ethics issued a second recommendation that authorized MDPs and other
fee-sharing arrangements, scaling back the prior recommendation,' 72 but
adding measures to preserve the profession's core values.' 73 The House
of Delegates voted in July 2000 by a resounding margin to reject the
recommendation and discharge the Commission from any further
to
activities. 174 As a consequence, all efforts at the national level
75
halt.'
abrupt
an
to
came
States
United
the
in
MDPs
accommodate
In 2009, ABA President Carolyn B. Lamm created the ABA
Commission on Ethics 20/20 to "perform a thorough review of the
[MRPCs] and the U.S. system of lawyer regulation in the context '1 of
76
advances in technology and global legal practice developments."
However, the Commission's most recent Discussion Paper on
Alternative Law Practice Structures clearly indicates that the
Commission has completely "ruled out" even proposing an amendment
to the model rules that would facilitate MDPs. 77 The 20/20
Commission's refusal to act represents the third occasion on which the
ABA has turned its back on 78
the MDP issue and reaffirmed its
complacency with the status quo.'
169. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 85 (citing ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice, Recommendations, Report, and Reporter's Notes on the ABA
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Appendix A, available at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpfinalreport.html).
170.

Id.at 86.

171. See Sheryl Stratton, ABA Rattles Unauthorized Practice of Law Saber While
DebatingMDPs, 86 TAx NOTES 1057 (1999).
172. See Biamonte, supra note 17, at 1174.
173. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 85-86.
174. Id.at 86-87; see also Sheryl Stratton & Lee A. Sheppard, American Bar Association
Says No to MultidisciplinaryPractice,88 TAx NOTES 311 (2000).

175. See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 89.
176. ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional responsibility/aba commission on ethics_20_20.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2012).
177. Jamie S. Gorelick & Michael Traynor, ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 Discussion
Paper on Alternative Law PracticeStructures, Dec. 2, 2011, availableat http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111202-ethics2020-discussiondraft-alp
s.authcheckdam.pdf ("The Commission has ruled out certain forms of nonlawyer ownership that
currently exist in other countries. In particular, the Commission rejected:
(c) multidisciplinary practices (i.e. law firms that offer both legal and non-legal services
separately in a single entity.)").
178. See Matheson, supra note 150, at 1130 (noting that the ABA has backed off revision
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct twice; once with the rejection by the ABA House of

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LA WAND CPAS

States are not bound by the ABA's MRPCs and are free to adopt
their own rules of professional conduct.' 79 Nevertheless, most states rely
heavily on the MRPCs as a guidepost for promulgating their rules.' 80 In
fact, while many jurisdictions have strongly considered authorizing
MDPs, 8 1 only one jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, has actually
adopted rules that clearly accommodate them.1 82 The adoption of rules
authorizing MDPs will likely promote partnerships between qualified
professional services firms and law firms. For example, in 1999 two
prominent tax attorneys took advantage of Washington D.C.'s more
lenient rules and formed an interdisciplinary alliance with Big Four
Accounting Firm Ernst & Young. 183 The newly-formed MDP firm,
Delegates of the recommendations of the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, and once
with the failure of the Ethics 2000 Commission to propose any significant revisions to the
Model Rules that would affect multidisciplinary practice).
179. Edward S. Adams & John H. Matheson, Law Firms on the Big Board?: A Proposal
for Nonlawyer Investment in Law Firms, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 11 (1998).
180. Id.
181. See Transcript, House of Delegates Annual Meeting, A.B.A. (July 11, 2000)
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional-responsibility/commission-mul
tidisciplinarypractice/mdphod transc.html. In the July 11, 2000 meeting of the House of
Delegates on MDPs, the President of the Colorado Bar Association argued that the ABA should
continue debate on the subject of MDPs in part because almost every state and metropolitan bar
had undertook to form a commission or committee to investigate the issue, but that work was
incomplete. Id.
182. Matheson, supra note 150, at 1283-84. In the 1980s, the District of Columbia voted in
Rule 5.4(b) of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct, which states:
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of organization in
which a financial interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by an
individual nonlawyer who performs professional services which assist the
organization in providing legal services to clients, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose providing legal
services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authority or holding a financial interest
undertake to abide by these Rules of Professional Conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial authority in the
partnership or organization undertake to be responsible for the nonlawyer
participants to the same extent as if nonlawyer participants were lawyers under
Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
D.C. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2011); Smith, supra note 31, at BI (noting

that D.C. is the only jurisdiction in the United States that currently authorizes MDPs).
183. Susan Beck, Bingham McCutchen to Acquire McKee Nelson, AMLAw DAILY, July 6,
2009, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/07/my-entry.html. In 1994, the Virginia
State Bar Standing Committee on Legal Ethics issued an opinion involving D.C. Rule 5.4 and a
multidisciplinary law firm in D.C. that had as partners both a nonlawyer and an attorney who
was a member of the Virginia Bar. VSB Comm. on Legal Ethics, Legal Ethics Op. 1584 (1994).
The committee concluded that D.C.'s rule enabled Virginia attorney to practice in that firm in
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McKee Nelson Ernst & Young, offered integrated legal and accounting
services.184 Although the success of experimental U.S.-based MDPs like
McKee Nelson Ernst & Young remains unproven,' 85 the immense
growth of MDPs throughout Europe and Australia strongly suggests that
they will thrive in the U.S. market if given the opportunity to do so.
MDPs offer a practical solution to the UPL problem. However, the
American legal profession's regulators continue to reject them based on
exaggerated arguments, unfounded fears of eroding the profession's
ethical obligations, form over substance reasoning, and, most
significantly, ignorance of clients' needs.' 86 In doing so, regulatory
bodies engage in economic protectionism' 87 and contravene the
underlying policy of legal ethics-protecting the public. The U.S.
Supreme Court has recognized that "ultimately competition will
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. 'The
heart of our national
economic policy long has been faith in the value of
' 88
competition.""
Two prominent federal governmental agencies, the U.S. Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, have highlighted the
dangers of the legal profession's protectionist stance.' 89 In 2002, these
two agencies submitted to the ABA Task Force a joint letter, warning
that the ABA's overbroad application of UPL rules "could restrain
competition between lawyers and nonlawyers to provide similar
services to American consumers." 90 The letter further explained that an
overbroad definition of the practice of law "is not in the public interest
because the harms it imposes on consumers by limiting competition are
9
likely much greater than any consumer harm that it prevents."' '
Nevertheless, as Jennifer Smith sarcastically pointed out in her recent
Wall Street Journalarticle, "[t]he legal profession's notion that law isn't
a commercial enterprise may come as a surprise, since some lawyers
now charge more than $1,000 an hour." 92 If the true policy behind
regulating the practice of law is to protect the public, the ABA and state
D.C., despite Virginia DR 3-103(A)'s prohibition of nonlawyers owning an interest in a firm
that practices law. Id.
184. Beck, supra note 183.
185. Smith, supra note 31, at B5 (noting that the number of firms which have taken
advantage of D.C.'s more lenient rules remains unclear).
186. Luppino, supra note 6, at 122.
187.

See id

188. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting
Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1950)); accordFTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,423 (1990).
189. Luppino, supra note 6, at 134-35 (citing DOJ/FTCJoint Letter to ABA, supra note 5).
190. Id.
191.

Id. at 135.

192.

Smith, supra note 31, at B1.
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bars should seriously reconsider their outright rejection of MDPs.

V. CPA SELF-REGULATION: MORE THAN ADEQUATE
PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC

Opponents of relaxing the UPL rules for CPAs argue that nonlawyer
professionals who either advise clients on peripheral legal matters or
serve clients through MDP firms undermine the core values of the
profession: competence, independent judgment, confidentiality, and
loyalty. 93 This view simply highlights the opponents' sheer ignorance
of other professions' ethical regulations.
CPAs, by virtue of their professional licensure, have already
exhibited the requisite technical proficiency and ethical prowess
necessary to protect the public. 194 Additionally, the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) Code of Professional Conduct
(CPC), in conjunction with its enforcement mechanisms, alleviates the
need for state bars to monitor CPAs' practices. 195 Similar to state bars,
state boards of accountancy regulate CPAs who practice within their
jurisdiction.' 96 Most states require as a prerequisite to sit for the CPA
exam completion of at least 150 credit hours of college and graduatelevel coursework (approximately 5 academic years of study).' 9 The 150
credit hour requirement typically includes 39 combined credit hours in
taxation, auditing, financial, cost, and managerial accounting,
information systems, and a minimum of 5 hours of business
accounting
98
law.'
In addition to the academic requirements, a candidate must pass all 4
sections of the rigorous Uniform CPA Examination (CPA Exam) within
18 months of each other.199 Each section of the CPA exam had between
193.
194.
195.
196.

See Dzienkowski & Peroni, supra note 11, at 174.
Melone, supra note 10, at 48.
See id. at 48-49.
See id. at 99.

197.

See Licensure Educational Requirements, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CPAs, http://

www.aicpa.org/BECOMEACPAILICENSURE/REQUIREMENTS/Pages/default.aspx#states
(last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
198. Id.; see, e.g., FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION,
http://www.myfloridalicense.com/dbpr/cpa/licensure.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). Florida's
licensure requirements are typical of most states and require at least two courses in business law,
only one of which may be lower than a junior-level course. See id. Many of the remaining
states' 150 hour requirements became effective in 2012. See, e.g., State of Delaware
Department of State: Division of Professional Regulation: Board of Accountancy, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://dpr.delaware.gov/boards/accountancy/faqs.shtml#Q6 (last visited Apr.
16,2012).
199. CPA Exam Pass Rates, AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CPAs, http://www.aicpa.org/Become
ACPA/CPAExam/PsychometricsandScoring/PassingRates/DownloadableDocuments/PassRates
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a 44% and 47% average pass rate in 201 1.200 In comparison, the July
2011 Florida Bar Exam's pass rate was 82%.201 Moreover, the CPA
Exam covers a significantly broad spectrum of complicated legal topics,
most of which topics are not covered in required courses of accredited
law school curricula. The CPA Exam's legal subjects range from basic
contract law to the 20complex
topics of secured transactions, choice of
2
entity, and taxation.

Finally, unlike the legal profession, most state boards of accountancoy
have added a one-year experience requirement for CPA licensure.
This requirement provides further assurance that a licensed CPA has
gained sufficient on-the-job training to render competent advice. As to
lawyers' proficiency in taxation, Juris Doctor curricula generally do not
require even a single tax course, and bar examinations almost uniformly
lack coverage of any federal tax law. 20 4 Because most attorneys lack
training in the area of taxation, some academics have proposed adding a
requirement that "tax practitioners" meet a higher standard of
proficiency than merely obtaining a Juris Doctor and passing a bar
2 5
examination.
0 These proposals would introduce separate certification,
experience, and
continuing education requirements for attorneys who

2011 .pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
200. Id.
201. Florida News Archive - Bar Admissions, Florida Bar Exam Results, SUNETHics,
http://www.sunethics.com/ba-results.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2012). The author acknowledges
that the different prerequisites to sit for these exams (i.e., the completion of a J.D. versus the
completion, in most states, of 150 hours of combined undergraduate and graduate coursework)
may contribute to the variance in these pass rates, however their comparison is intended only to
emphasize the rigorous licensure requirements for CPAs and CPAs unique qualification for a
status-based exemption from UPL enforcement.
202. The Regulation Section of the Uniform CPA Exam covers the following areas of
substantive law: professional responsibility, I.R.S. Circular 230, federal securities law,
contracts, sales, commercial paper, secured transactions, bankruptcy, debtor-creditor
relationships, agency, employment and environmental regulation, property, and insurance,
federal tax process, procedures, accounting, and planning, as well as federal taxation of property
transactions, individuals, and entities (which include sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited
liability entities, C corporations, S corporations, joint ventures, trusts, estates, and tax-exempt
organizations). Content and Skill Specificationsfor the Uniform CPA Examination, AM. INST. OF
CPAs, http://www.aicpa.org/BecomeACPA/CPAExam/ExaminationContent/ContentAndSkills/
DownloadableDocuments/CSOs-SSOs-Effective.7-1-1 1.pdf (July 1, 2011). In addition, the
exam requires candidates to perform tax research, evaluate the tax implications of different legal
structures for business entities, and apply analytical reasoning tools to assess how taxes affect
economic decisions related to the timing of income/expense recognition and property
transactions. Id.
203. See, e.g., FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BusINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, supra
note 198.
204. See Black & Black, supra note 6, at 79-80 (noting the lack of tax knowledge of most
attorneys, including "tax lawyers").
205. Id. at 96-97.
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to ensure competency
hold themselves out as tax practitioners in 2order
06
in the diverse and complex areas of tax law.
In addition to the rigorous CPA licensure requirements, the AICPA
Code of Professional Conduct includes rules that are substantially
similar to the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers. Thus, the
AICPA CPC provides adequate protection for the public. As a threshold
matter, the CPC mandates that CPAs "commit themselves to honor the
public trust." 207 The CPC also addresses the legal profession's core
values of independent judgment, confidentiality, and loyalty. As to
independent professional judgment, the CPC specifically provides that,
"[r]egardless of service or capacity, members should protect the
integrity of their work, maintain objectivity, and avoid any
subordination of their judgment. ' ' 20 8 The CPC also requires CPAs to
maintain client confidentiality, stating that "[a] member in public
practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without
the specific consent of the client." 20 9 This requirement is practically
identical to MRPC Rule 1.6(a), which states that "[a] lawyer shall not
reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the
client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by
paragraph (b). ' ' 21 ° Finally, when a CPA provides consulting services to
a client, AICPA Standards for Consulting Services ensure that the CPA
acts with loyalty to the client. Section seven of these rules requires the
CPA to "[s]erve the client interest by seeking to accomplish the
with the client while
objectives established by the understanding
21 1
maintaining integrity and objectivity.",
Similar to state bar enforcement mechanisms, the Professional Ethics
Division investigates potential violations of the CPC by AJCPA
212
members and may expel or suspend a member from practice.
Additionally, state boards of accountancy, like state bars, can take

206.

Id.

207. AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT, § 53.04 (2012), available at http://www.
aicpa.org[Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/Pages/etsection53articleii the public_intere

st.aspx.
208. Compare id. § 55.02, with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (2011).
209. Compare AICPA CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT § 301.01, with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011).
210. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011).
211. Compare Statement on Standardsfor ConsultingServices No. 1, Am. Inst. of CPAs, at
7, http ://www.aicpa.org/Interest/Areas/ForensicAndValuation/Resources/Standards/Pages/State
ment%20on%2OStandards%20for/o2oConsulting%20Services%20No.aspx (last visited Apr. 16,
2012), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. (2011).
212. See AICPA Definitions of Ethics Sanctions, AM. INST. OF CPAs, http://www.aicpa.

org/interestAreas/forensicandvaluation/resources/standards/pages/statement%2on%20standard
s%20for%/o2consulting%20services%20no.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2012).
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corrective action or impose sanctions that include probation
suspension, revocation of license, limitation of practice, and fines.211
Although the above discussion of AICPA rules addresses only the
primary concerns that opponents of relaxed UPL rules have raised, a
more in-depth review of the AICPA CPC will yield only one
conclusion-these rules provide more than adequate protection for the
clients that CPAs advise. 2 14 In sum, the legal profession can best serve
and protect the public interest by allowing CPAs to freely practice in
their areas of expertise under their own rules of professional conduct.21 5
CONCLUSION

The principal policy behind the legal profession's rules of
professional conduct is protection of the public. Throughout history, the
legal profession has purportedly sought to promote this policy by
regulating and enforcing UPL rules. UPL rules boil down to two
fundamental issues: (1) which activities constitute the "practice of law,"
and (2) which of those activities are "unauthorized." State regulatory
bodies and courts alike have been largely unsuccessful in answering the
first of these questions, particularly in the context of professional
services. Because accounting and tax services are practically
indistinguishable from what most jurisdictions consider the practice of
law, CPAs have mounted a powerful attack against UPL rules in an
effort to obtain an exemption from their enforcement. Augmenting
CPAs' efforts, the U.S. Congress and Department of the Treasury have
enacted legislation and regulations that expressly authorize CPAs to
provide a broad spectrum of tax-related services. Additionally, the Tax
213. See, e.g., Florida Board of Accountancy, SOREIDE LAW GROUP LLC, http://www.
floridalicenselaws.com/floridaboardofaccountancy.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
214. In addition to the CPC, the AICPA has also promulgated detailed professional
standards on the various other areas of practice in which CPAs engage. See, e.g., Statements on
Standards for Tax Services (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.aicpa.org/Research/
Standards/Tax/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).
215. In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123, 124-25 (S.C. 1992). The
South Carolina Supreme Court stated in its 1992 In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules

opinion:
Our respect for the rigorous professional training, certification and licensing
procedures, continuing education requirements, and ethical code required of
[CPAs] convinces us that they are entitled to recognition of their unique status
...
. [w]e are confident that allowing CPAs to practice in their areas of

expertise, subject to their own professional regulation, will best serve to both
protect and promote the public interest.
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Court Rules permit CPAs to represent tax litigation clients in a federal
judicial court, and Congress has extended to these CPA representatives
practitioner-client privilege. The federal preemption doctrine has
provided an effective mechanism for CPAs to leverage federal action
and override the overbroad and unreasonable state UPL rules.
Accordingly, the federal government
has turned otherwise
impermissible activities of CPAs into the authorized practice of law.
Beyond tax compliance, an enormous demand for integrated legal,
accounting, tax, and business advisory services exists in today's global
markets. Responding to this demand, countries outside the United States
have removed the lines of demarcation between the accounting and
legal professions by modifying their UPL rules to accommodate MDPs.
The Big Four accounting firms have taken full advantage of this UPL
deregulation, launching large-scale, fully-integrated MDP practices to
become some of the largest providers of legal services in the world.
Despite the valiant efforts of the U.S. accounting profession and other
pro-MDP constituencies, the ABA and practically every state bar has
refused to acquiesce, rejecting MDPs altogether.
The operation of strict and vague UPL rules has ultimately
contravened their purpose of protecting the public. Rather than
promoting delivery of competent advice, the rules have instead
precluded qualified nonlawyer professionals from offering services
within their fields of expertise. Opponents of relaxed UPL rules claim
that these rules promote the core values of the profession: competence,
independent judgment, confidentiality, and loyalty. However, by virtue
of their professional licensure, CPAs are not only more capable than
attorneys to render certain tax and business advisory services, but are
also bound by an exhaustive code of professional conduct that arguably
protects the public more effectively than the legal profession's rules. In
sum, to truly serve the public interest, the ABA and state bars should
grant CPAs a status-based exemption from UPL rules and modify these
rules to accommodate the market demand for integrated legal, tax, and
business services by authorizing multidisciplinary practice.
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